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OPINION BELOW 
Gaw v. Linqle, P.2d (Utah Ct. App. 1990) was 
decided September 13, 1990. A copy of the opinion is attached 
hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A". 
JURISDICTION 
Under Rule 48(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari may be filed with the Clerk of 
this Court within 30 days of entry of a decision by the Court 
of Appeals of Utah. The date of the decision by the Court of 
Appeals is September 13, 1990. 
PARTIES 
Fay Gaw was the Plaintiff at trial, and Appellant 
before the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Jimmy Wray Lingle and Roadrunner Trucking were 
Defendants at trial, and Respondents before the Court of Appeals 
of Utah. 
2 
The State of Utah was a party before the trial court, 
but was granted Summary Judgment prior to trial. Fay Gaw also 
appealed the grant of Summary Judgment. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
(CASES) 
Gaw v. State of Utah, P.2d 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), attached as Exhibit "A" . . . . . 4, 5, 7 
Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981) 7 
Joraensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80,82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
attached as Exhibit "B" 6 
(RULES) 
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 6 
Rule 48, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 2 
(COLLATERAL SOURCES) 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §288A (1965) .7 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the violation of a statute, designed to 
avoid the type of injury which occurred, is negligence per se, 
prima facia evidence of negligence, or something else? 
2. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals properly 
characterized the instruction in question in this case as 
negligence per se? 
3. Whether the giving of the instruction in question 
constituted harmless error? 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury case which went to trial for 
several days in the Seventh Judicial District Court for Carbon 
County. 
On April 16, 1984, the plaintiff, Fay Gaw, pulled out 
from a stop sign on a side street, directly into the path of a 
semi-tractor-trailer travelling southbound on a main highway, 
State Road 6, near Helper, Carbon County, Utah. She was well 
familiar with the intersection. TR 599-600, 593, 596, 585-86, 
597, 587, 598. The day was clear and the roads were dry. TR at 
554 and 566. 
The intersection provided a lane for traffic travelling 
the path which plaintiff intended to travel, that is, for 
traffic leaving Helper from the side road, and turning left 
(South) onto Highway 6. The lane did not even merge into 
southbound traffic on Highway 6 but continued south until it 
became a lane of its own. TR at 655-659; Exhibits of the 
Highway Configuration at trial; Gaw v. State of Utah, P.2d 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), Slip Opinion at 1, attached as 
Exhibit "A". 
Rather than travel down the appropriate lane just 
described, with which she was very familiar, the plaintiff 
continued to cross the highway, intending to turn left, and 
drove into the path of the semi-tractor-trailer, the driver of 
4 
which tried to avert the collision. TR at 655-659; Exhibits of 
the Highway Configuration at trial; Gaw v. State of Utah, above, 
Slip Opinion at 1. The plaintiff sustained serious injuries. 
At trial certain instructions were given concerning the 
plaintiff's conduct, which were the subject of the appeal to the 
Court of Appeals in Utah. See Gaw v. State of Utah, above, Slip 
Opinion at 3, 5-8. 
At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict 
that the plaintiff was 75% negligent, and the defendants, Lingle 
and Roadrunner Trucking, were 25% negligent. Gaw v. State of 
Utah, above, Slip Opinion at 2. 
The State of Utah had been dismissed from the case 
prior to trial on the State's motion for summary judgment. Gaw 
v. State of Utah, above, Slip Opinion at 2. 
The Court of Appeals found that one of the 
instructions, concerning the plaintiff's alleged contributory 
negligence, constituted an instruction of negligence per se 
which was reversible error. The Court of Appeals failed to 
consider the fact that other instructions gave the jury complete 
discretion to determine the percentage of fault attributable to 
each party including attributing a minimum amount of fault to 
the plaintiff. The case was remanded for a new trial. 
5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case and another decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals have come to contrary conclusions concerning whether 
violation of a statute, designed to protect against the injury 
involved, is negligence per se. In this case, the Court of 
Appeals admitted that Utah Appellate Courts have confused the 
issue of law in question. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides some of the types of reasons that will be considered by 
this honorable Court as grounds for issuing a Writ of 
Certiorari. Rule 46(a) states: 
When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law. 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals of Utah 
rendered a decision in direct conflict with a recent prior 
decision of the Court of Appeals of Utah on the same issue of 
law. 
In Jorqensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987), 
attached as Exhibit "B," the court of appeals stated that 
violation of a statute is negligence per se: 
. . . [I]t is well established that violation 
of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se 
6 
which may be excused if the negligent actor is 
confronted with an emergency not his own 
fault. Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 851 (Utah 
1981); Restatement (Second) of Torts, §288A 
(1965). 
Id. at 82. 
In the opinion in this case, Gaw v. Linqle, above, the 
Court of Appeals held that the violation of a statute may be 
considered only as evidence of negligence and is not negligence 
per se. Slip Opinion at 6. Because of the instruction in 
question, the verdict was vacated and the case remanded for 
trial. 
In Gaw v. State of Utah, above, the Appellate Court 
admitted that confusion exists on the issue in the Appellate 
Courts of Utah: 
The parties disagree about whether the 
violation of statute or ordinance, such as 
occurred when Gaw made her illegal turn onto 
Highway 6, constitutes "per se" or "prima 
facia" negligence in Utah. Their confusion is 
not surprising because Utah Appellate Courts 
have also occasionally confused these terms. 
Id., Slip Opinion, at 5 (Emphasis added). 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the recognized confusion in the Appellate 
Courts of Utah, and the existence of contrary decisions within 
the Court of Appeals, a Writ of Certiorari should issue to the 
7 
Court of Appeals in this case, and all issues in the case 
reviewed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12^ day of October, 
1990. 
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Exhibit A 
F I L E D 
SEP*" 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO ^*n c^-irl •" v«*<*a»b 
Fay Gaw, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
State of Utah, by and through 
its Department of 
Transportation: Carbon County; 
City of Helper; Jimmy Wray 
Lingle; Allstate Ins. Company, 
an Illinois Corp.; Roadrunner 
Trucking, a New Mexico Corp.; 
and John Does I through X, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Seventh District, Carbon County 
The Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
Attorneys: Robert J. Debry, Edward T. Wells, Daniel F. Bertch, 
Gordon K. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Jody K. Burnett and Joy L. Sanders, Salt Lake City, 
for Department of Transportation 
Robert R. Wallace and Scott F. Squire, Salt Lake 
City, for Roadrunner Trucking 
Before Judges Davidson,1 Bullock,2 and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
On April 16, 1984, Fay Gaw was turning left from a side 
street onto Highway 6 in Helper, Utah. Gaw apparently drove 
across a merge lane and into the through lane of traffic when 
she was hit by a truck driven by Jimmy Wray Lingle and owned by 
Roadrunner Trucking. Gaw was paralyzed from the chest down as 
1. Judge Davidson concurred in this opinion prior to his 
resignation effective September 1, 1990. 
2. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) 
(1990) . 
£1990 
* Dor»n 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890139-CA 
a result of the accident. She brought suit against Lingle 
claiming that he had negligently operated the truck and against 
Roadrunner as the employer of Lingle, She also brought suit 
against the State of Utah claiming that the intersection was 
negligently designed, constructed and maintained.3 
On January 30, 1986, Gaw's deposition was taken at the 
instance of Lingle. The court reporter transcribed the 
testimony and delivered a copy of the deposition to Gaw's 
attorney. On March 14, Gaw received a sheet from the reporter 
on which to make appropriate corrections to her deposition. In 
May, Gaw's attorney sought and obtained an extension of time to 
correct the deposition and file it with the court. Gaw made 
approximately fifty changes to her deposition, which were filed 
with the deposition in June 1986. 
In July 1986, defendants moved to suppress the changes in 
Gaw's deposition, claiming that the corrections were not made 
in compliance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e), that Gaw 
had given a false excuse for making substantial changes to the 
deposition, and that the changes would prejudice the 
defendants. In February 1988, the court granted defendants1 
motions and suppressed the changes to Gaw's deposition. 
In March 1988, the state filed a motion for summary 
judgment. Gaw filed a motion in opposition along with her own 
affidavit and the affidavits of two engineers who stated their 
opinions that the intersection was faultily designed. The 
trial court granted the state's motion for summary judgment, 
finding that Gaw had failed to produce any evidence that the 
intersection was faultily designed or that such design had 
caused the accident. 
In September 1988, a jury trial was held to determine the 
liability of Lingle and Roadrunner. On special verdict, the 
jury found Gaw 75% liable for the accident and Lingle 25% 
liable. 
During the trial, Gaw attempted to admit testimony from a 
"human factors" expert to the effect that Gaw had behaved in a 
reasonable and prudent manner and that Lingle had not behaved 
reasonably under the circumstances. The trial court did not 
allow the expert to testify in conclusory legal terms about the 
3. Gaw brought suit against other defendants, but they were 
dismissed from the case and are not parties to this appeal. 
reasonableness of the parties' actions. It did, however, allow 
the expert to testify extensively about the misleading nature 
of the intersection, the likelihood that Gaw was confused by 
the intersection markings, and the distinction between her 
subjective and objective confusion. 
Defendants submitted three proposed jury instructions, 
each of which stated that the conduct described in the 
instructions "is negligence." Gaw objected to these 
instructions because they effectively incorporated a standard 
of per se negligence contrary to Utah law,4 The court noted 
Gaw's objection but gave the instructions as tendered. 
On appeal, Gaw raises three arguments. First, Gaw argues 
that the court improperly limited the testimony of her human 
factors expert. Second, Gaw challenges the jury instructions 
to which she objected below. Finally, Gaw argues that the 
court improperly granted summary judgment to the state, 
primarily due to the court's decision to suppress the changes 
Gaw sought to make to her deposition. We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for a new trial. 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Gaw challenges the trial court's decision prohibiting the 
human factors expert from testifying that Gaw's actions before 
the accident constituted reasonable, prudent conduct.5 In 
order to prevail on this issue, Gaw must demonstrate that the 
trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert 
testimony. Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445, 447 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Moreover, she must demonstrate that "the 
4. Gaw also objected to one of the instructions because it did 
not state Lingle's duty of reasonable care within the 
instruction. Lingle's duty was adequately defined in other 
jury instructions and, therefore, we find this argument to be 
without merit. 
5. Gaw also argues that the trial court excluded testimony 
concerning the reasonableness of Lingle's conduct. However, 
the court made no specific ruling on that aspect of the 
expert's testimony. Thus, nothing in the record suggests that 
Gaw's expert was prohibited from discussing the reasonableness 
of Lingle's conduct. Gaw cannot challenge a ruling the court 
did not make. 
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excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial 
influence in bringing about a different verdict." 
Redevelopment Aaencv v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1303-04 (Utah 
1987) . 
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that a witness who has 
been qualified as an expert may testify "[i]f scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue." Utah R. Evid. 702. Moreover, that testimony may 
embrace "an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact." Utah R. Evid. 704. 
As a general rule, it is within the discretion of the 
trial court to determine whether a particular expert is 
qualified and whether particular testimony would be helpful and 
suitable in a particular case. Ostler, 781 P.2d at 447. 
However, the trial court does not properly exercise that 
discretion where its decision is based upon a misconception of 
law. In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 579 P.2d 514, 523, 
146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978) (en banc). See also Kirkham v. 4.60 
Acres of Land, 100 Idaho 785, 605 P.2d 959, 962 (1980) (court 
abuses discretion when it fails to apply the law). ££. Naranio 
v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (though 
trial court has considerable discretion in adjusting financial 
interests of divorced parties, appellate court will overturn 
decision if based upon misunderstanding or misapplication of 
the law). 
In this case, the court based its decision to exclude the 
expert's testimony in large part upon its erroneous view that 
it was obligated to give the jury per se negligence 
instructions. The court stated with our emphasis: 
[0]ne of the problems you have is this 
jury instruction that says: "If you 
violate the law, that's negligence. 
That's not what a reasonable person would 
do." How does that conform with [expert 
testimony that certain behavior is 
reasonable] if there is a violation of the 
law? . . . It's just inconsistent with 
what the jury has to determine. In other 
words, even though she may have been 
mis[led] and drove across, and the law 
says she won't drive across, I have to 
tell the jury if she does that, 
regardless, she is negligent. So that 
would make it inconsistent. I instruct 
them, and then [the expert testimony] 
would be inconsistent with my 
instructions. To me that creates a 
doubtful situation; doesn't help the jury 
at all[;] just confuses them. 
Because the court based its decision to exclude the expert 
testimony on a misconception of the law, we hold that the 
decision was necessarily an abuse of discretion. 
Although we conclude that the court erroneously excluded 
the testimony, that error is harmless because the inclusion of 
that testimony would not have resulted in a different verdict. 
It is true that the court prohibited the expert from 
specifically stating his opinion that Gaw's conduct was 
reasonable. However, the expert testified at length that the 
intersection was very confusing, that many drivers would have 
been confused by the intersection, and that Gaw was very likely 
confused by the intersection. The obvious conclusion from the 
expert's testimony was that Gaw acted reasonably under all the 
circumstances. Though the court should not have excluded those 
specific words, the message was clearly communicated in the 
expert's testimony. Consequently, we hold that even though the 
court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony, the 
abuse does not constitute reversible error. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
The trial court, in three jury instructions, advised the 
jury that certain actions on the part of a driver constituted 
negligence. Gaw argues that these types of "per se" negligence 
instructions are inappropriate and constitute reversible 
error. We agree with Gaw's position, at least as to one of the 
court's instructions, and therefore reverse the trial verdict 
against her. 
The parties disagree about whether the violation of a 
statute or ordinance, such as occurred when Gaw made her 
illegal turn onto Highway 6, constitutes "per se" or "prima 
facie" negligence in Utah. Their confusion is not surprising 
because Utah appellate courts have also occasionally confused 
these terms.6 However, though the terminology has been 
6. Compare, g^ fl. , Joroensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) (using "per se" terminology) with Hall v. Warren, 632 
P.2d 848, 850-51 & n.l (Utah 1981) (using "prima facie" 
terminology) (cited in Joroensen, 739 P.2d at 82). 
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confused, the concept has remained the same and was succinctly 
stated in Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 
1162 (Utah 1978). 
[T]he violation of a statute does not 
necessarily constitute negligence per se 
and may be considered only as evidence of 
negligence . . . . [The violation] may be 
regarded as "prima facie evidence of 
negligence, but is subject to 
justification or excuse . . . ." 
Id. at 1164-65 (quoting Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 
30, 395 P.2d 62, 64 (1964)) (emphasis added). "Prima facie" 
negligence is the correct standard and a trial court commits 
prejudicial error when it gives a jury instruction which 
provides that the violation of a statute is. negligence without 
the possibility for justification or excuse.7 Xci. at 1164. 
The trial court in this case did not contemplate that the 
standard in Utah is "prima facie." During the trial, at a 
conference in chambers, the court stated with our emphasis: 
Because one of the problems you have is 
that we give this jury an instruction that 
says: "If you violate the law, that's 
negligence. That's not what a reasonable 
person would do." . . . I have to tell the 
jury if she [violates the law], she's 
negligent. 
Based upon this mistaken view of the law, the court gave three 
jury instructions which Gaw challenges on appeal. 
7. Trial courts need not and probably should not use the 
technical term "prima facie" in their jury instructions, at 
least not without clear explanation of the term. It is 
sufficient to state that the violation of a statute is evidence 
of negligence but "subject to justification or excuse if the 
evidence is such that it reasonably could be found that the 
conduct was nevertheless within the standard of reasonable care 
under the circumstances." Thompson v. Ford Motor Co.. 16 Utah 
2d 30, 395 P.2d 62, 64 (1964). Moreover, as long as the 
concept is clear from the instructions, the terminology used 
will not invalidate the instruction. 
Instructions 14 and 18 provided: 
[Instruction No. 14]: When the law makes 
it the duty of a driver of one vehicle to 
yield the right of way to a second 
vehicle, that duty arises as soon as the 
two vehicles are close enough to each 
other to constitute an immediate hazard. 
Such a hazard exists whenever a reasonably 
prudent person in the position of the 
driver of the first vehicle, would 
apprehend the probability of colliding 
with the second vehicle if the driver of 
the first vehicle attempted to proceed on 
the intended course of travel. Failure to 
yield the right of way under such 
circumstances is negligence. 
[Instruction No. 18]: A vehicle may not 
be operated over, across, or within any 
painted or other dividing space, median or 
barrier of a divided highway, if such 
space or median is clearly visible to a 
reasonably observant person, except where 
authorized by an official traffic control 
device or peace officer. 
Failure to operate a vehicle in 
accordance with the foregoing requirement 
of the law is negligence on the part of 
the driver. 
These instructions, though not framed as -prima facie" 
instructions, allowed the jury to consider some limited 
justifications and excuses for the conduct which may be a 
technical violation of the law. For example, if Gaw could 
prove that she reasonably did not apprehend the probability of 
the collision when she proceeded into the intersection, her 
failure to yield might have been excused under instruction 14. 
Moreover, her failure to stay off the median strips and painted 
lines might have been excused under instruction 18 if she could 
prove that the lines in the intersection were not clearly 
visible to the reasonably observant person. 
It is easy to envision facts not encompassed by the 
language in instructions 14 and 18 which would nevertheless 
tend to justify or excuse the prohibited conduct described in 
those instructions, making those instructions inappropriate in 
r»rt/>ior% n * 
a range of cases. However, the instructions appear, under the 
totality of the facts before us, to sufficiently encompass any 
justifications and excuses that Gaw actually offered at trial 
for her conduct. Consequently, we hold that instructions 14 
and 18 were sufficient, if barely so, under the circumstances 
of this case.8 
Unlike instructions 14 and 18, however, jury instruction 
number 17 does not provide for any justification or excuse. 
That instruction states: 
The operator of a vehicle intending 
to turn left shall turn onto the roadway 
being entered, in the extreme left hand 
available lane for traffic moving in the 
new direction of travel. 
Failure to operate a vehicle in 
accordance with the foregoing requirements 
of the law is negligence on the part of 
the driver. 
If the jury found that Gaw had turned left into any lane other 
than the extreme left lane, the jury had to find Gaw negligent 
under this instruction. Neither this instruction, nor any other 
instruction read in conjunction with this instruction, allowed 
the jury to consider justifications or excuses for the improper 
turn. This was a strict "per se" instruction and we must 
therefore reverse on the basis of this instruction. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Finally, Gaw argues that the court erred when it granted 
the state's summary judgment motion. Summary judgment is only 
appropriate when the moving party has demonstrated "that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c); Transamerica Cash Res., Inc. v. Dixie Power & 
Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). Because a challenge 
to summary judgment presents only questions of law, we review 
8. Although we hold that instructions 14 and 18 were sufficient 
in this case, we do not mean to suggest that they were in any 
way ideal instructions which could not be improved upon on 
remand to more fully explain the role and range of 
justifications and excuses for the proscribed conduct. 
the trial court's decision for correctness, id,., and "analyze 
the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
losing party." Provo Citv Corp. v. State, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 
8, 9 (1990), 
The trial court gave two reasons for granting the state's 
motion. First, it found the affidavits from Gaw's experts were 
conclusory and without foundation and therefore did not support 
the conclusion that the intersection was faultily designed. 
Second, the court found that Gaw had unambiguously stated in 
her deposition as initially transcribed that she was not 
confused by the intersection. The court refused to consider 
the numerous changes she made to her deposition and ordered 
them suppressed. The court also refused to consider the 
assertions in her subsequent affidavit that she was confused, 
concluding she had not adequately explained the discrepancy on 
that issue which appeared from her deposition. Consequently, 
the court found that the design of the intersection was not a 
cause of the accident. 
On appeal, Gaw argues that genuine issues exist as to both 
the inadequate design of the intersection and to her own 
confusion. She argues that the experts' affidavits 
sufficiently demonstrated that the intersection was faultily 
designed. Moreover, she argues that her original deposition, 
her amended deposition, and her affidavit all asserted the 
position that she was confused by the intersection and all 
should have been considered by the trial court. We now 
consider each of these arguments. 
A. Expert Opinion Concerning Faulty Design 
The trial court ruled that the affidavits of Gaw's experts 
concerning the faulty design of the intersection were 
inadequate because they were "without foundation as to the 
highway design and they do not specify what standards the State 
did not follow or should have followed in this instance," On 
appeal, Gaw argues that the court's conclusions were 
incorrect. Although we are not sure precisely what the trial 
court found missing from the experts' affidavits,9 we hold 
9. The court's two stated concerns were that the affidavits 
stated "conclusions without foundation as to the highway 
design" and that they failed to specify the standards which the 
state did not follow. Having reviewed the affidavits, we find 
that they contained both of these elements. As to foundation, 
both experts identified particular aspects of the intersection 
and surrounding area which made the intersection misleading and 
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that they adequately complied with the standard we set forth in 
American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
In Lochhead, we articulated a standard for determining the 
sufficiency of an expert's affidavit in the summary judgment 
context. First, we stated that Utah Rule of Evidence 704 
allowed the expert to state his opinion concerning the ultimate 
issue in the case. Jjl. at 273. We then recognized that "[a]n 
expert affidavit must also contain a sufficient factual basis 
for the opinion proffered." I£. at 274. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(e).10 To determine the extent of the factual basis 
required, we looked to Utah Rule of Evidence 703 which allows 
an expert to base an opinion on admissible evidence and 
inadmissible evidence of the kind that experts in the field 
use. l£L. We concluded that the affidavit was sufficient if it 
articulated the facts upon which the opinion was based and if 
the facts were of the "type usually relied upon by experts in 
the field." I£. 
(Footnote 9 continued) 
dangerous. As to the applicable standard, one expert stated 
that the design was "totally in conflict with normal 
engineering practices." The other expert identified and quoted 
from two publications dealing with highway safety and design. 
Consequently, we fail to perceive the deficiencies about which 
the trial court was concerned. 
10. The rule requiring an expert affiant to state the factual 
basis for his or her opinion appears to be at odds with Utah 
Rule of Evidence 705, which allows an expert to give his or her 
opinion without stating the facts and data upon which he or she 
relied. However, Rule 705 also recognizes that the expert may 
have to divulge the basis for his or her opinion if the court 
requires and if requested upon cross examination. Since an 
affiant is not subject to cross examination, it makes some 
sense to require the expert affiant to divulge at least part of 
the basis for his or her opinion. Stated another way, Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(e)vs explicit requirements that affidavits "be made 
on personal knowledge" and "set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence," together with its implicit recognition 
that statements in an affidavit must not be conclusory in form, 
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983), and that 
affidavits not contain unsubstantiated opinions, Treloaoan v. 
Treloaaan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) (per curiam), control 
in the summary judgment context over Utah R. Evid. 705. 
In Lochhead, the expert was a licensed property and 
casualty claims manager. Id- at 273- His opinion was that 
American Concept had breached its duties of good faith and fair 
dealing. Id. That opinion was based upon an examination of 
American Concept's adjuster's files. Id- We held that because 
the adjuster's files were the type of materials upon which 
experts in the field relied, the affidavit was sufficient and, 
therefore, we reversed the summary judgment. Id. at 274. 
Under the Lochhead analysis, the affidavits in this case 
were sufficient. Gaw's experts each averred to be engineers 
with some expertise in the area of traffic and/or highway 
design. Both experts stated in their affidavits that the 
intersection was dangerous and/or failed to meet safety 
standards in the industry. The basis for one expert's opinion 
was his examination of the intersection siteQ The other expert 
based his opinion on a diagram of the intersection, police 
reports and photographs, Gaw's deposition, and traffic court 
data. Clearly, the facts articulated in the affidavits are the 
type relied upon by experts in the field. Thus, we hold that 
the affidavits were sufficient and should not have been 
disregarded by the trial court. They raise an issue of 
material fact as to the negligent design of the intersection. 
B. Evidence that Gaw was Confused by the Intersection 
The state argued that even if the intersection was 
negligently designed, there was no evidence that Gaw was 
actually confused by the intersection and thus the 
intersection's design was not a proximate cause of the 
accident. The trial court agreed. Gaw argues that her 
original deposition, amended deposition, and affidavit all 
created an issue of fact concerning her confusion and all 
should have been considered by the court. We will treat each 
of these three sources separately. 
1. Original Deposition 
First, Gaw argues that her original deposition alone was 
sufficient to raise an issue concerning her confusion. We 
disagree. Gaw was repeatedly asked during her initial 
deposition whether she was confused by the intersection. She 
repeatedly stated that she was not.11 
11. The following excerpts are illustrative of Gaw's initial 
deposition testimony: 
o n n i o n /-»* i I 
The only testimony from her initial deposition relied upon 
by Gaw to demonstrate that she was confused by the intersection 
is as follows: 
Q: Is there anything about the 
intersection markings or signs that you 
were unable to understand? 
A: Well, it was always confusing 
there, the way they had the lines going 
that way, this way, and which way. 
Q: What was the confusion? 
A: Well, you really just had to 
watch what you're doing and stay in the 
lane and watch where you're going, because 
they were always marked crazy. 
This testimony only demonstrates that the intersection required 
extra attention to successfully navigate it. It does not 
demonstrate that Gaw was in fact confused on the day of the 
accident, especially in light of her many statements that she 
had not been confused. See note 11, supra, and accompanying 
text. Thus, we hold that Gaw's initial deposition testimony was 
(Footnote 11 continued) 
Q: Mrs. Gaw, when you entered the 
intersection on the day of the accident, 
were you confused by anything? 
A: No, cause I had driven that two 
or three times or more. 
Q: . . . Do you have any memory or 
do you feel that you were confused by any 
of these lines in this intersection? 
A: Not that I remember. There 
was—They didn't ever bother me before and 
I don't remember. 
not sufficient to raise an issue of material fact concerning 
whether she was confused on the day of the accident. 
2. Changes to Deposition Testimony 
Gaw attempted to change her deposition testimony in over 
fifty places. She did so by means of "correction sheets," 
prepared by herself outside the presence of the court reporter 
who took the deposition. The reporter filed the sheets along 
with the deposition as initially transcribed. Some of the 
changes were merely to clarify and to correct typographical 
errors but many were substantive. For example, Gaw was asked 
during the deposition: "Do you have any memory about whether 
or not, at the time of the accident, you were confused by the 
lane markings?" In her original deposition, she responded: 
"No, I don't." In her corrected answers she stated "Yes, I was 
confused for the lines were changed often." A few lines later 
she was asked: "That answer you gave to the previous question 
is, 'No, You don't know whether you were confused?'" Initially 
she responded: "Uh-huh." In her corrected answers she 
stated: "Yes I was confused, that place is very confusing to 
anyone." Finally, she was asked: "I want to make sure you're 
clear on that last question he was asking you. At this time, 
okay, do you have any memory or do you feel that you were 
confused by any of these lines in this intersection?" She 
responded: "Not that I remember. There was—They didn't ever 
bother me before, I don't remember." She corrected the 
response to state "Yes, it is very confusing for anyone." 
Defendants moved to suppress the changes to Gaw's 
deposition. The court granted the motion to suppress and 
consequently did not consider the changed answers in its 
decision to grant the summary judgment motion. The basis for 
the court's decision was "that changes to the substance [of] 
the deposition testimony were entered by plaintiff upon the 
deposition and not by the officer before whom the deposition 
was taken as required in Rule 30(e)." On appeal, Gaw asserts 
that the court erred in suppressing the deposition changes. We 
disagree. 
Initially, we note that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e) 
is drafted very broadly to allow "changes in form or substance 
which the witness desires to make." Although some commentators 
have puzzled over the liberality of this rule, see, e.g.,, 
Scully, A Brief History of Deposition Editing, 15 Litigation 43 
(Spring 1989), courts have generally not limited the number and 
kinds of changes a deponent can make. See, e.g., Lugtig v. 
Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. 111. 1981) (mem.) (69 changes 
including many substantive changes); Allen & Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (mem.) (377 
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changes of which 73 were substantive); De Severskv v. Republic 
Aviation Corp. , 2 F.R.D. 113, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (34 
substantive changes). But see Barlow v. Esselte Pendaflex 
Corp., 111 F.R.D. 404, 406 (M.D.N.C. 1986) ("manner and number 
of changes disclose a lack of good faith"). Thus, though 
defendants grouse about the kinds of changes Gaw made to her 
deposition testimony, that argument does not support 
suppression of the changes. 
The question before us is whether the court should have 
suppressed the changes for Gaw's failures to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 30(e). Rule 30(e) requires that changes 
"be entered upon the deposition by the officer with a statement 
of the reasons given by the witness for making them." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 30(e) . 
Although courts have allowed liberal changing of 
deposition testimony, they have been fairly strict in requiring 
compliance with the technical requirements of Rule 30(e). See, 
e.g., Sanford v. CBS, Inc.. 594 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. 111. 
1984) (mem.) (requiring specific reasons for each change); 
Luatig, 89 F.R.D. at 642 (requiring changes to be written in 
deposition after original answer, specific reasons for changes, 
and changes to be made by the reporter). That strictness has 
been tempered somewhat by the willingness of trial courts to 
permit deponents a further opportunity to comply with the 
technical requirements of Rule 30(e) rather than simply 
striking or suppressing attempted changes not in compliance 
with the rule. In Sanford and Luatia the courts required the 
deponent to amend the depositions as per the rule, with the 
proviso this be done at the deponents* expense. 594 F. Supp at 
715; 89 F.R.D. at 642. Moreover, where changes have been 
extensive, courts have allowed the opposing party to reopen the 
deposition for further examination, costs to be paid by the 
deponent whose changes, after all, created the problem. See, 
e.g., 594 F. Supp. at 715; 89 F.R.D. at 642. The patience of 
trial courts in this regard is not, however, boundless. In 
Barlow, the deponent made over a hundred changes to the 
deposition, including the deletion of large blocks of the 
deposition, and failed to provide any reasons for the changes. 
Ill F.R.D. at 406. Moreover, the changes were so extensive 
that it was "virtually impossible for the [court] reporter to 
enter the changes upon the deposition as he is required to 
do." I&. The court found the Barlow deponent's actions to be 
"at variance with the letter and spirit of Rule 30(e)" and 
declared the attempted changes a "nullity." Id. 
The facts before us do not warrant the same remedy reached 
by the Barlow court. Although there were numerous changes to 
the deposition in this case, many of which were admittedly 
substantive, Gaw offered some semblance of a specific reason 
for each. The reporter would not have had difficulty entering 
them on the deposition. Moreover, the method for making 
changes employed by Gaw, while at variance with the clear 
requirements of Rule 30(e), was consistent with the reporter's 
instructions on the correction sheet given to Gaw.12 
Suppression of the changes was a drastic remedy which courts 
usually reject in the absence of bad faith.13 
12. The instructions on the correction sheet stated: 
After reviewing the transcript of 
your deposition, please fill out this 
correction sheet indicating any changes 
you deem necessary. 
This is a verbatim record of what was 
actually said and no grammatical 
corrections should be made. If there are 
corrections or insertions, please initial 
the correction sheet and briefly state 
your reasons therefor. For example, 
spelling error, clarification, transcriber 
error, et cetera. 
Please do all corrections with 
typewriter or black ink. 
Complying with the the instructions on this sheet can hardly be 
viewed as "bad faith" of the sort which concerned the court in 
Barlow. See 111 F.R.D. at 406. 
13. The only evidence of bad faith which appears from the 
record was the false representation to the court that Gaw was 
suffering from an undiagnosed and untreated diabetic condition 
during the initial deposition. It is noteworthy that this 
excuse was not offered on the correction sheet completed by Gaw 
herself nor in her subsequent affidavit, but appears only in 
Gaw's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion to 
suppress, which was prepared and signed by counsel. Though we 
do not condone such a false representation to the court, it is 
better sanctioned under Utah R. Civ. P. 11 where made by an 
attorney rather than a party. Such an after-the-fact 
mischaracterization by counsel should not be the basis for the 
suppression of deposition changes which rule 30(e) so liberally 
allows. See also note 12, supra. 
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However, Gaw's response to the motion to suppress did not 
include, even in the alternative, a request for an opportunity 
to comply with the requirements of Rule 30(e) and an offer to 
reopen the deposition at her expense. She only argued that she 
was entitled to make the changes in the manner she did. 
Moreover, on appeal she does not contend she was entitled to 
alternative relief but steadfastly continues to argue only that 
her changes were validly made despite her non-compliance with 
Rule 30(e). The matter being presented in this posture, where 
appellant did not seek the more moderate response of the 
Sanford and Luotia courts either at the trial court nor on 
appeal, we reject her argument that her deposition changes were 
properly made and affirm the trial court's decision to suppress 
them for failure to comply with Rule 30(e). It follows that 
nothing in her corrected answers was effective to create a 
factual dispute. 
3. Gaw's Affidavit 
Gaw submitted an affidavit, along with her memorandum in 
opposition to the state's motion for summary judgment. The 
trial court stated that Gaw's deposition demonstrated she was 
not confused by the intersection and that "the Court will not 
allow her to change those statements by affidavits . . . since 
she has offered no explanation as to why she would be mistaken 
at the time of the deposition." Gaw asserts that the affidavit 
contained an adequate explanation which raised a genuine issue 
concerning her confusion. We agree. 
The general rule in Utah is that an affiant may not "raise 
an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his 
deposition, unless he can provide an explanation of the 
discrepancy." Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 
1983). In Webster, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a summary 
judgment because the contradictory affidavit "wholly failed to 
explain the discrepancy between the deposition and the 
affidavit." Id. 
In this case, unlike Webster, Gaw did not wholly fail to 
explain the discrepancy. According to the affidavit, she had 
previously thought, including at her deposition, that she was 
turning into the merge lane of the highway and not into the 
through lane as was ultimately established. She thought she 
was properly following the lines through the intersection. She 
thought the lines had taken her correctly into the merge lane. 
Moreover, she assumed that the accident had occurred in the 
merge lane. At her deposition, she understood the questions to 
reflect these same assumptions, responded to them under these 
assumptions, and accordingly had no subjective sense of being 
confused. Only later, according to defendant, did she discover 
her assumptions were incorrect and that she had actually driven 
into the through lane meaning to have driven into the merge 
lane. Therefore, at her deposition, she truly did not believe 
that she was confused by the intersection, although obviously 
she was thoroughly confused, having completely misapprehended 
her route of travel and what lane she ended up in.1^ 
This case is similar to the case of Kennett-Murrav Corp. 
v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980). In Bone, there was a 
discrepancy between the affiant's affidavit and his earlier 
deposition. The court noted that the "affidavit did not 
purport to raise a new matter, but rather to explain certain 
aspects of his deposition testimony." i£l. at 894. Namely, the 
affiant explained that certain responses were given under the 
mistaken assumption that the questions concerned one document 
when they in fact concerned another. The court was satisfied 
with the explanation in the affidavit because it was "at least 
plausible." I&. ££. Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire 
Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1364-65 (8th Cir. 1983) (opposite result 
reached where "affidavit was inherently inconsistent with his 
prior deposition [and] not plausible"). 
14. Gaw's human factors expert gave at trial the following 
explanation for Gaw's confusion and the discrepancy in the 
deposition: 
[A] person can be mis[led], in which case 
they're not aware. And if they're not 
aware they're mis[led], that in that sense, 
they're really not confused . . . . 
[S]omeone on the outside looking at what 
happened [would say]: "Well, if she did 
that, it's very likely she was confused but 
didn't know it." You see, that's the 
difference. I'm more comfortable with the 
term 'mis[led],' than I am 'confused;' 
because some connotations of the word 
'confused' would indicate that the person 
was aware they were confused. But— 
There's some differences between those two 
terms. 
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Although the trial court in this case apparently did not 
believe Gaw's explanation for the discrepancies, we find her 
explanation is not inherently inconsistent with the responses 
in her initial deposition*15 We do not have to be persuaded 
by the explanation or even find it compelling. As long as it 
is plausible, the fact finder should be allowed to weigh the 
credibility of the explanation. See Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 
805 F.2d 949, 953 (11th Cir. 1986) ("A definite distinction 
must be made between discrepancies which create transparent 
shams and discrepancies which create an issue of 
credibility.M). Gaw's affidavit raised a genuine issue of fact 
concerning whether she was confused by the intersection. 
C. Summary 
The trial court erred in granting the state's summary 
judgment motion. The expert affidavits adequately raised a 
genuine issue of fact concerning the negligent design of the 
highway. Gaw's affidavit raised an issue of fact concerning 
whether Gaw was in fact confused by the intersection. The 
credibility of Gaw's final position was one for the trier of 
fact and not properly disposed of on summary judgment. We 
15. Many of Gaw's deposition responses are consistent with the 
explanation in her affidavit of the apparent discrepancies. 
The following exchange is illustrative: 
Q: On the date of the accident, did 
you use that merge lane? 
A: Well, I always did before, but, 
sir, I don't know. I can't remember 
whether I went there or what. I pulled 
out into the center and he was coming and 
I stopped. That's it. I don't remember 
after that. I wish to God I did. 
Q: What you are telling me, then, is 
you do not know whether you used the merge 
lane that you used on prior occasions in 
driving this same route on the day of the 
accident? 
A: I always had before, so why would 
I change it for one time? 
accordingly reverse the summary judgment and remand for a trial 
or other appropriate proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the court should have allowed Gaw's human factors 
expert to testify on the reasonableness of Gaw's conduct prior 
to the accident, the error was not prejudicial because the 
expert effectively conveyed his message even without using 
those magic words. The trial court gave jury instructions 
under the mistaken assumption that the violation of a statute 
or ordinance constitutes negligence "per se." It was 
reversible error to give an instruction to that effect. 
Finally, the trial court improperly granted the state's summary 
judgment motion because material issues of fact existed 
concerning the negligent design of the intersection and 
concerning whether Gaw was in fact confused by the intersection. 
We reverse and remand for a new trial or other proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
jV Robert Bullock, Judge 
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raised are waived. It logically follows that 
the availability of a petition for rehearing 
should not be implied from the absence of 
any express prohibition in the statute, and 
we reject plaintiffs contention to that ef-
fect 
[4] The jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Commission over workers' compensation 
cases is fixed by statute, as is this Court's 
jurisdiction over judicial review of the Com-
mission's orders. See Schockmeyer v. In-
dustrial Commission, 23 Utah 2d 346, 463 
P.2d 562 (Utah 1970); see also 3 Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, § 80.52(a) 
(1986). Based upon our reading of the 
review provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-82.51 et seq. and case law under the 
former statutory provisions, we conclude 
that the commission had no jurisdiction to 
consider the Petition for Reconsideration of 
Denial of Motion to Review.7 The time for 
filing a petition for writ of review with this 
Court began to run on November 20, 1986, 
the date of notice of the order of the com-
mission disposing of the case on the mer-
its.8 No petition for writ of review was 
filed within thirty days of the date of notice 
of the order as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-83 (1986). This Court is without 
jurisdiction to review the final order of the 
commission because plaintiffs petition for 
writ of review was not timely filed. Plain-
tiffs petition for writ of review is, accord-
ingly, dismissed. 
BENCH, BILLINGS and DAVIDSON, 
JJ., concur. 
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7. As in the Ferguson case, although the proceed* 
ings subsequent to November 20, 1986 were 
without authority, they did not change the result 
previously reached. 221 P. at 1099. The No-
vember 20, 1986 order is the final order of the 
commission for purposes of seeking judicial re-
view. 
• fT^h r^H* Ann. $ 35-1-82.56 (1986) provides: 
Neil JORGENSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
T. 
Allen ISSA, dba Allen's TV & 
Electronics, Defendant and 
Respondent 
No. 860012-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 1, 1987. 
Tractor trailer owner brought negli-
gence action against motorist, seeking 
damages allegedly sustained when tractor 
trailer overturned. The District Court, 
Sevier County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered 
judgment on verdict finding each party 50% 
negligent, and owner appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that 
court's instructions adequately set out 
owner's theory of case. 
Affirmed. 
1. Trial «=»203(1) 
A party is entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case. 
2. Appeal and Error «»1067 
Trial *»268 
Failure to give requested instructions 
is reversible error if it tends to mislead the 
jury to the prejudice of the complaining 
party or insufficiently or erroneously advis-
es the jury of the law. 
3. Appeal and Error *=»1067 
It is not prejudicial error to fail to use 
specific requested jury instructions if the 
substance of the requested instructions is 
covered in the instructions given. 
of the entry of any administrative law judge's 
order or any order or award of the commission. 
The mailing of the copy of said order or award 
to the last known address shown in the files of 
the commission or any party in interest and to 
the attorneys or agents of record in the case, if 
any, shall be deemed to be notice of said order." 
The November 20, 1986 order reflects that it 
*»«« mailed to plaintiff on the same date. 
4. Trial s=>228(3), 267(1) 
In light of the entitlement of a party to 
have the jury instructed on his theory of a 
case, the basic theory espoused must be 
explained to the jury in ordinary, concise 
and understandable language, although the 
exact requested language need not be giv-
en. 
5. Negligence *=>6, 12 
Violation of a statute or ordinance is 
negligence per se, which may be excused if 
the negligent actor is confronted with an 
emergency not his own fault 
6. Trial «=»251(3), 260(7) 
Trial court's refusal of plaintiffs pro-
posed instructions that violation of statute 
or duty might be subject to excuse or justi-
fication, in action concerning vehicle acci-
dent, was not error, since there was no 
indication that plaintiff violated statute and 
court's other instructions, describing non-
statutory duty of reasonable care and sud-
den emergency doctrine, adequately set out 
plaintiffs theory of the case. 
JORGENSEN v. ISSA Utah g l 
Cite a* 739 ?3d 80 (UtahApp. 1987) 
Before GREENWOOD, DAVIDSON 
and JACKSON, JJ. 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Earl Jay Peck, Clark 
R. Nielsen, Nielsen & Senior, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and appellant 
Ray Ivie, Provo, for defendant and re-
spondent 
1. Instruction 12: 
It was the duty of a driver of a vehicle to use 
reasonable care under the circumstances in 
driving his vehicle to avoid danger to himself 
and others and to observe and be aware of the 
condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, 
and other existing conditions; in regard, he was 
obliged to observe due care in respect to: 
A. To use reasonable care to keep a lookout 
for other vehicles, or other conditions reason-
ably to be anticipated. 
B. To keep his vehicle under reasonably 
[sic] safe and proper control. 
C. To drive at such speed as was safe, rea-
sonable and prudent under the circumstances, 
having due regard to the width, surface and 
condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, 
the visibility, and any actual or potential haz-
ards then existing. 
D. To keep a lookout for persons or vehicles 
upon the highway, and whenever it appears to 
be reasonably necessary in the exercise of due 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff, Neil Jorgensen, brought an ac-
tion against Allen Issa to recover damages 
incurred when plaintiffs tractor trailer 
overturned while rounding a curve on U.S. 
Highway 89 in Joseph, Utah. The jury 
found plaintiff and defendant each 50 per-
cent negligent On appeal plaintiff claims 
the trial court erred by refusing to allow a 
jury instruction that negligence might be 
subject to excuse or justification. 
On December 28, 1981, plaintiffs son, 
Todd Jorgensen, was driving a tractor trail-
er loaded with approximately 287 sheep. 
As he rounded a curve in the road his 
tractor trailer overturned and slid on its 
side killing 150 sheep. At trial plaintiff 
claimed defendant was driving towards 
Todd straddling the center yellow lime pre-
paring to make a left turn. Plaintiff claims 
his son swerved to avoid defendant and the 
tractor trailer (overturned. At trial the 
court gave instructions 12 l and 12A *, ad-
dressing the reasonable person standard 
and the sudden emergency doctrine respec-
tively. However, the jury was not given 
plaintiffs instruction 10, which stated as 
follows: 
care for the safety of others, to sound the 
horn, to warn others for their safety. 
Failure to operate his vehicle in accordance 
with the foregoing requirements of the law 
would constitute negligence on his part. 
2. Instruction 12A: 
A person, who without negligence on his part, 
is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with 
peril arising from either the actual presence or 
the appearance of imminent danger to himself 
or to others is not expected nor required to use 
the same judgment and prudence that may be 
required of him in calmer and more deliberate 
moments. 
In such a situation, his duty is to exercise only 
the degree of care which an ordinary prudent 
person would exercise under the same or sim-
ilar circumstances. If, at that moment, he exer-
cises such care, he does all the law requires of 
him, even though in light of after-events, it 
might appear that a different choice and man* 
ner of action would have been better and safer. 
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If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that either driver in this case 
conducted himself in violation of any 
statute or duty I have read to you, then 
such conduct constituted negligence on 
his part 
A violation of such a statute or duty by a 
driver may be subject to justification or 
excuse if the driver's conduct can never-
theless be reasonably said to fall within 
the standard of reasonable care under 
the circumstances. The following facts 
may be considered in determining wheth-
er a driver is excused or justified in 
violating a statute or duty: 
a. The driver is unable after reasonable 
diligence or care to comply with the 
statute or duty; or 
b. He is confronted by an emergency 
which was not caused by his own mis-
conduct; or 
c Compliance would involve a greater 
risk of harm to the driver or to others. 
[1-4] The sole issue on appeal is wheth-
er the trial court erred in failing to submit 
instruction 10 to the jury. A party is clear-
ly entitled to have the jury instructed on 
his theory of the case. Watters v. Querry, 
626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981); Black v. 
Knight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977); 
Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164,168, 417 
P.2d 664, 666 (1966). Failure to give re-
quested instructions is reversible error if it 
tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice 
of the complaining party or insufficiently 
or erroneously advises the jury on the law. 
In re Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 96 
(Utah 1985). However, it is not prejudicial 
error to fail to use specific instructions if 
the substance of the requested instructions 
is covered in the instructions given. Strat-
um v. Nielsen, 25 Utah 2d 124, 126, 477 
P.2d 152, 153 (1970). The exact language 
need not be given but the basic theory 
espoused must be explained to the jury in 
ordinary, concise and understandable lan-
guage. Gilhe8pie v. DeJong, 520 P.2d 878, 
880 (Utah 1974). 
In this case plaintiffs theory was that if 
the jury found Todd Jorgensen negligent 
by failing to keep the truck under reason-
ably safe and proper control, by driving too 
fast for the curve, or by failing to keep a 
lookout for other vehicles, that negligence 
was excused or justified when he was con-
fronted with an emergency, i.e., defend-
ant's vehicle straddling the center line. On 
appeal plaintiff contends that this theory 
was not adequately explained to the jury 
due to the judge's failure to read instruc-
tion 10 to the jury. 
[5, 6] Plaintiffs contention fails for two 
reasons. First, it is well established that 
violation of a statute or ordinance is negli-
gence per se which may be excused if the 
negligent actor is confronted with an emer-
gency not his own fault. Hall v. Warren, 
632 P.2d 848, 851 (Utah 1981); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A 
(1965). In order for plaintiffs excuse or 
justification theory to apply, a standard of 
safety set by statute or ordinance must 
have been violated. In this case, the jury-
was not instructed on and the facts do not 
indicate that plaintiff violated a statute or 
ordinance. The only statutory violation the 
jury was instructed on involved defendant 
Second, instructions 12 and 12A gave the 
jury the appropriate standards for deter-
mining whether or not appellant was negli-
gent Instruction 12 describes the nonstat-
utory duty to "use reasonable care under 
the circumstances" and instruction 12A 
correctly states the sudden emergency doc-
trine. These instructions were sufficient to 
fairly and completely present appellant's 
theory of the case. The jury, pursuant to 
those instructions, apparently found that 
under the circumstances appellant was neg-
ligent in failing to reasonably keep his 
vehicle under control and/or maintain a 
reasonably safe speed. The finding of 
negligence took into account, as part of the 
circumstances, that appellant was suddenly 
confronted with defendant's vehicle strad-
dling the center line. 
Affirmed. 
DAVIDSON and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
